Description: Official! US Declassified United States Government ~ Official Georgetown University Asian Arms Control Project Strategic Implications of China’s Underground Great Wall Dr. Phillip A. Karber with assistance from Tim Brown, Wes cross, J. M LaGray and the students of seminars: arms control and multipolarity and #457 Asian arms control prospects #569 11 September 2011 Home study version High Quality Binded Soft cover double sided x1 is included in this listing please see all photos before bidding additional photos can be sent if necessary you will receive the item(s) pictured please ask any and all questions before buying. All items are subject to be shipped in multiple packages and can be canceled at any time, we reserve the rights for the shipping carrier to be chosen at our discretion, no items will be shipped until payment is completed. Payment is due within 3 business days of sale date. 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Contents Sichuan earthquake tunnel exposure Twenty-five years of cave defense Civil defense tunneling Patterns of early nuclear, naval, and airbase tunneling 2nd Artillery underground Great Wall -Phase 1: 1985-1995 - liquid rocket “roll out clothes” -Phase 2: 1996-2010 - solid fuel SRBM-IRBM “ enhanced mobility” -Phase 3: 2011-?? Tunnel based Road/rail mobile MIRVed ICBM Operational concepts: hide, surge, strike, move, hard Breakout in instability: uncertainties in the problems of monitoring and verification PLA deterrence theory – minimum versus war fighting issues for arms control 2nd artillery comes out of the cave 2nd Actually translate article Collection Other Notes: Nuclear security analysts are becoming increasingly worried about China’s development of a 3000-mile underground “Great Wall” to shelter their nuclear weapons. The tunnel network introduces serious doubts about the United States’ ability to carry out a disarming nuclear first strike against China, by introducing uncertainty about the number of Chinese weapons, their location within the underground fortress, and the capability of U.S. weapons to penetrate into the bunker. Despite complicating the effectiveness of a U.S. first strike, the Chinese construction of a tunnel system validates the strategy of seeking nuclear primacy over China. By forcing the Chinese pursuit of numerous defensive measures to ensure second-strike capability, the United States reduces the amount of money China can spend to improve their nuclear weapons. The resulting relative lack of appealing first-strike options may make China think twice before escalating from conventional to nuclear war and, more significantly, may dissuade China from creating conditions that could produce conventional conflict in the first place. The orientation of Chinese nuclear policy is largely defensive. The tunnel network is the capstone of a long-term project to create a mobile, sheltered nuclear arsenal that is less vulnerable to first strike. This project has seen them construct a nuclear submarine capability and a variety of short- and intermediate-range mobile missiles that could be used to attack U.S. allies or forward-deployed military forces such as aircraft carriers. Importantly, although China is developing long-range road mobiles, these weapons are numerically de-emphasized, with a primary emphasis on short-range ballistic missiles. This suggests that China is focusing on defending their homeland and interests in their near-abroad rather than attempting to achieve parity with U.S. nuclear forces. A recent Wall Street Journal op ed opines that China’s massive network of tunnels indicates a secret, hostile motive: One kilometer of tunneling is approximately equal to the cost of four or five nuclear weapons and certainly several delivery systems," [Kraber] notes. Why would China devote such vast resources to building a protective network of tunnels, while devoting comparatively few to the weapons the tunnels are meant to protect? To me, the more plausible reading of this statement is to conclude that China has likely spent so much money on tunneling that it has not been able to spend significantly on the development of offensive nuclear capabilities – such as low yield warheads or long-range ballistic missiles. Their current strategy is centered on self-defense in the event of a war over East Asia. If China did not fear losing this war, they would have greater capabilities to prepare to fight different ones – including, perhaps, strategic nuclear wars against the continental United States. China’s declaratory policy of “No First Use” matches this assessment of their current defensive orientation. Although there are a number of circumstances when China would consider abandoning its declaratory policy – when it’s facing defeat in a conventional war, for example – the existence of the pledge goes quite a ways in shaping Chinese strategic discussions. Intellectuals do not typically ponder nuclear first-strike contingencies. As a result, should a circumstance arise that may make China contemplate abandoning NFU, they may not possess the strategic consensus required to be confident in the efficacy of various first-strike options. This reality may make China hesitate to escalate to nuclear conflict and, more significantly, it may make Beijing think twice before initiating a conflict that might result in circumstances where it would need to rethink its NFU promise. China’s nuclear capabilities follow from the retaliatory, second-strike approach of its defense posture. Estimates place China’s nuclear stockpile at 250-400 weapons, a fraction of the 1550 strategic weapons the United States deploys under New START. An arsenal this size could do significant damage to the United States and our allies, but it is not large enough to achieve strategic victory in a nuclear war with the U.S. Some might attribute this defensive emphasis to Chinese strategic culture. Indeed, the relative consistency of their nuclear doctrine since testing in 1964 suggests that cultural factors may play a role in sculpting their nuclear decision-making. However, debates among Chinese strategists about whether to maintain minimum deterrence or adopt a slightly more robust limited deterrent indicate the opposite: Chinese defense policy has a certain degree of fluidity. In that vein, it would be extremely short-sighted for the United States to follow a singular narrative of Chinese nuclear strategy in adopting policies that incentivize a shift away from China’s primarily defensive nuclear planning. China’s stated intention for building its massive underground tunnel is to ensure second-strike capability against the United States. Given the importance of this underground network to China’s nuclear weapons complex (they’ve been working on it since 1995), it’s fair to assume that similar motives guide China’s overall nuclear policy. However, it is unwise to expect the centrality of these motives to persist into perpetuity. A changing international environment may prompt China to reevaluate their defense goals. Pro-engagement commentators make this argument. For instance, Carnegie’s Michael Swaine argues: China’s strategic mindset is quintessentially defensive, largely reactive, and focused first and foremost on deterring Taiwan’s independence and defending the Chinese mainland, not on establishing itself as Asia’s next hegemon. Although it is not inconceivable that China might adopt more ambitious, far-flung military objectives in the future—perhaps including an attempt to become the preeminent Asian military power—such goals remain ill-defined, undetermined and subject to much debate in Beijing. This suggests that China’s future strategic orientation is susceptible to outside influence, not fixed in stone. As a result of this malleability, Swaine suggests that the United States should “shape a ‘mixed’ regional approach focused more on creating incentives to cooperate than on neutralizing every possible Chinese military capability of concern to U.S. defense analysts.” I would like to suggest a different interpretation of this malleability. Given their growing economy, China will have increasing means to acquire greater economic and military leverage over international events. It serves their national interest to take advantage of these opportunities. At many junctures, the United States national interest will compete with China’s – over economic issues such as Asian market access and over military issues such as forward deployment of naval power and the status of Taiwan. Although cooperation must play an important role in the United States’ relationship with China, it is unrealistic to expect countries that are so economically powerful yet politically divergent to agree over all critical international issues. High-stakes disagreements are inevitable. Most of these will be resolved without violence, if not amicably, based on an assessment by either side of the potential risks and rewards of taking an openly combative stance. One way that China can limit U.S. freedom of action in these disputes is to develop greater offensive nuclear capabilities – such as more and low yield warheads and more long-range ballistic missiles – and work towards nuclear parity with the United States. Even though the U.S. nuclear arsenal would likely still outstrip China’s, the possibility of a costly and uncertain escalation (as opposed to a situation in which the United States possessed escalation dominance) may prevent the United States from intervening in issues that are of greater importance to China than to the United States, such as Chinese attempts to stabilize the DPRK regime or develop amphibious weaponry for a potential attack of Taiwan. Given their greater resources, superior nuclear forces will serve China’s national interests regardless of U.S defense policy. Fortunately, U.S. nuclear primacy helps to change the valence of that build-up, orienting it towards a defensive stance by making it too expensive to develop useful but non-essential offensive nuclear capabilities. The grave threat of U.S. nuclear first strike is, thus, a contributor to China’s current defensive nuclear posture. Ceasing the pursuit of primacy would serve as a de facto acknowledgement of mutual vulnerability; it would free up resources for China to make progress on other, more offensive components of its arsenal. These measures, pursued in the absence of a U.S. nuclear first strike option, would give China the means to prepare for nuclear first-use contingencies. This would not only make them more confident about last-ditch escalation to nuclear war in a failing conventional conflict, but also give them less pause about initiating conflicts, given their expectation of greater freedom of action. In short, forcing China to plan to defend itself against U.S. first strike orients their strategic culture around defensive as opposed to offensive posturing and reduces their means to invest in offensive nuclear capabilities. Thus, while China’s tunnel network reduces the likelihood that the United States possesses nuclear primacy, it is a form of strategic tunnel vision to argue that we should, as a result, accept a reality of mutual vulnerability. Continuing to introduce meaningful doubt into China’s understanding of the security of their deterrent forces them to spend to protect it, rather than spending to threaten or compete with the United States. So, given China’s 3000 mile tunnel system, can we continue to introduce this meaningful doubt into China’s defense calculus? I think so. Current anti-tunnel technology, used most prominently by the Israelis to prevent smuggling of arms into Gaza, is used locally and is surprisingly ineffective. The United States faces an even greater challenge than Israel: it cannot continuously bombard China’s tunnel network in the way that Israel continuously bombards smuggling tunnels into Gaza, because that could jeopardize crucial areas of cooperation with Beijing and may even be understood as a precursor to preventative nuclear first-strike. However, technological development in anti-tunnel technology has been constant. A new two-component explosive that can be planted remotely seems promising, and further developments could be achieved through concerted research. Further, a good deal of information exists about China’s underground missile base, to which the tunnel network is a mere corollary. Holding this base at risk with earth penetrating nuclear weapons such as the B61-11 would call into question China’s second-strike capability. Further, entrances and exits to the tunnel system could be identified through satellite surveillance. Triangulation between various tunnel entrances and known missile base information could guide barrage nuclear strikes that close off the tunnels, even while not fully destroying them In brief, despite China’s tunnel system, we should not abandon the pursuit of nuclear primacy over China. While the scope of their tunnel system suggests that China could pose an increasing nuclear threat, it also suggests, more importantly, that our current strategy is working in compelling them to develop defensive as opposed to offensive nuclear capabilities. 免费优先邮件运送 官方的！美国解密美国政府 ~ 官方乔治城大学亚洲军控项目中国地下长城的战略意义 Phillip A. Karber 博士在 Tim Brown、Wes cross、J. M LaGray 和研讨会学生的协助下：军备控制和多极化和#457 亚洲军控前景 #569 2011 年 9 月 11 日家庭学习版高质量装订软封面双面 x1 包含在此列表中，请在出价前查看所有照片，如有必要，可以发送附加照片，您将收到图片中的物品购买前询问任何和所有问题。所有物品都必须分多个包裹运送，并且可以随时取消，我们保留自行选择运输承运人的权利，在付款完成之前不会运送任何物品。付款应在销售日期后的 3 个工作日内支付。我们保留在出价结束后因未付款、粗鲁买家或低反馈或任何其他原因而自行决定取消拍卖的权利。如果订单已经打包，我们也可能不会取消订单。国际买家需支付更高的运费。 []如果他们在确认购买之前没有给我发送消息，则任何具有 15 岁以下正面反馈的买家可能不会被允许购买超过 20 美元（包括运费）黑白文本 买方承担正确使用所有物品的责任。是的，如果这是存档地址，我们可以运送到您的酒店房间。物品将运送到文件的地址。不接受退货，所有退回的商品将收取 50% 的进货费。物品将由买家承担费用退回所有物品均按原样出售，不要让这笔交易通过您购买。所有物品均来自烟和无猫之家。请务必查看我的其他列表！ Miǎnfèi yōuxiān yóujiàn yùnsòng guānfāng de! Měiguó jiěmì měiguó zhèngfǔ ~ guānfāng qiáozhì chéng dàxué yàzhōu jūn kòng xiàngmù zhōngguó dìxià chángchéng de zhànlüè yìyì Phillip A. Karber bóshì zài Tim Brown,Wes cross,J. M LaGray hé yántǎo huì xuéshēng de xiézhù xià: Jūnbèi kòngzhì hé duō jí huà hé#457 yàzhōu jūn kòng qiánjǐng#569 2011 nián 9 yuè 11 rì jiātíng xuéxí bǎn gāo zhìliàng zhuāngdìng ruǎn fēngmiàn shuāng miàn x1 bāohán zài cǐ lièbiǎo zhōng, qǐng zài chūjià qián chákàn suǒyǒu zhàopiàn, rú yǒu bìyào, kěyǐ fāsòng fùjiā zhàopiàn, nín jiāng shōu dào túpiàn zhōng de wùpǐn gòumǎi qián xúnwèn rènhé hé suǒyǒu wèntí. Suǒyǒu wùpǐn dōu bìxū fēn duō gè bāoguǒ yùnsòng, bìngqiě kěyǐ suíshí qǔxiāo, wǒmen bǎoliú zìxíng xuǎnzé yùnshū chéngyùn rén de quánlì, zài fùkuǎn wánchéng zhīqián bù huì yùnsòng rènhé wùpǐn. Fùkuǎn yīng zài xiāoshòu rìqí hòu de 3 gè gōngzuò rì nèi zhīfù. Wǒmen bǎoliú zài chūjià jiéshù hòu yīn wèi fùkuǎn, cūlǔ mǎi jiā huò dī fǎnkuì huò rènhé qítā yuányīn ér zìxíng juédìng qǔxiāo pāimài de quánlì. Rúguǒ dìngdān yǐjīng dǎbāo, wǒmen yě kěnéng bù huì qǔxiāo dìngdān. Guójì mǎi jiā xū zhīfù gèng gāo de yùnfèi. [] Rúguǒ tāmen zài quèrèn gòumǎi zhīqián méiyǒu gěi wǒ fāsòng xiāoxī, zérènhé jùyǒu 15 suì yǐxià zhèngmiàn fǎnkuì de mǎi jiā kěnéng bù huì bèi yǔnxǔ gòumǎi chāoguò 20 měiyuán (bāokuò yùnfèi) hēibái wénběn mǎifāng chéngdān zhèngquè shǐyòng suǒyǒu wùpǐn de zé rèn. Shì de, rúguǒ zhè shì cúndàng dìzhǐ, wǒmen kěyǐ yùnsòng dào nín de jiǔdiàn fángjiān. Wùpǐn jiāng yùnsòng dào wénjiàn dì dìzhǐ. Bù jiēshòu tuìhuò, suǒyǒu tuìhuí de shāngpǐn jiāng shōuqǔ 50% de jìnhuò fèi. Wùpǐn jiāngyóu mǎi jiā chéngdān fèiyòng tuìhuí suǒyǒu wùpǐn jūn àn yuányàng chūshòu, bùyào ràng zhè bǐ jiāoyì tōngguò nín gòumǎi. Suǒyǒu wùpǐn jūn láizì yān hé wú māo zhī jiā. Qǐng wùbì chákàn wǒ de qítā lièbiǎo! 内容 四川地震隧道暴露 二十五年的洞穴防御 民防隧道 早期核、海军和空军基地隧道的模式 二炮地下长城 - 第一阶段：1985-1995 - 液体火箭“推出衣服” -第 2 阶段：1996-2010 - 固体燃料 SRBM-IRBM“增强机动性” -第 3 阶段：2011-??基于隧道的公路/铁路移动 MIRVed ICBM 操作概念：隐藏、涌动、打击、移动、硬 不稳定的突围：解放军威慑理论的监测和验证问题的不确定性——军备控制的最低限度与战争问题 第二炮从山洞里出来 2nd 实际翻译文章合集 其他说明：核安全分析家越来越担心中国开发 3000 英里长的地下“长城”来保护他们的核武器。隧道网络引入了关于中国武器的数量、它们在地下堡垒中的位置以及美国武器渗透到中国的能力的不确定性，从而对美国对中国进行解除武装的第一次核打击的能力产生了严重怀疑。掩体。 Nèiróng sìchuān dìzhèn suìdào bàolù èrshíwǔ nián de dòngxué fángyù mín fáng suìdào zǎoqí hé, hǎijūn hé kōngjūn jīdì suìdào de móshì èr pào dìxià chángchéng - dì yī jiēduàn:1985-1995 - Yètǐ huǒjiàn “tuīchū yīfú” -dì 2 jiēduàn:1996-2010 - Gùtǐ ránliào SRBM-IRBM“zēngqiáng jīdòng xìng” -dì 3 jiēduàn:2011-?? Jīyú suìdào de gōnglù/tiělù yídòng MIRVed ICBM cāozuò gàiniàn: Yǐncáng, yǒng dòng, dǎjí, yídòng, yìng bù wěndìng dì túwéi: Jiěfàngjūn wēishè lǐlùn de jiāncè hé yànzhèng wèntí de bù quèdìng xìng——jūnbèi kòngzhì de zuìdī xiàndù yǔ zhànzhēng wèntí dì èr pào cóng shāndòng lǐ chūlái 2nd shíjì fānyì wénzhāng héjí qítā shuōmíng: Hé ānquán fēnxī jiā yuè lái yuè dānxīn zhōngguó kāifā 3000 yīnglǐ cháng dì dìxià “chángchéng” lái bǎohù tāmen de héwǔqì. Suìdào wǎngluò yǐnrùle guānyú zhōngguó wǔqì de shùliàng, tāmen zài dìxià bǎolěi zhōng de wèizhì yǐjí měiguó wǔqì shèntòu dào zhōngguó de nénglì de bù quèdìng xìng, cóng'ér duì měiguó duì zhōngguó jìnxíng jiěchú wǔzhuāng de dì yī cì hé dǎjí de nénglì chǎnshēngle yánzhòng huáiyí. Yǎntǐ.
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Type: Textbook
Language: Chinese
Publication Name: Strategic Implications of China’s Underground Great Wall
Author: Dr. Phillip A. Karber
Country/Region of Manufacture: China
